

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Telcon	Presidential Phone Call to the Amir of Kuwait, August 4, 1990 5:15 - 5:31 pm (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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2005-1147-MR
JL 12/15/09



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential Phone Call to the Amir of Kuwait

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Amir Sheikh Jaber
Sandra Charles, NSC
Ambassador al-Sabah, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 4, 1990; 5:15-5:31 pm; Camp David

The President: Your Highness, it is very good to hear your voice. I just want you to know that the American people are with you and the people of Kuwait during this terribly traumatic and difficult time.

Amir Jaber: Mr. President, I wish to thank you personally and the people of the United States for your position which has resulted from your beliefs.

The President: I will not be happy until you are in your rightful place in control with your people in Kuwait. I want you to know that no western allies will sell out to any puppet regime put in place by Saddam. I wanted you to hear it personally from me, sir.

Amir Jaber: I am confident, Mr. President, in your leadership and your sincere desire to see things go back to normal.

The President: I was especially encouraged when I talked to President Ozal. I told him we are seriously considering closing the pipeline. And with US encouragement we will get Saudi Arabia to close theirs too. We the US are also pushing Chapter 7 at the UN, and we will take a leadership role to stop all shipping of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil until you are back in your rightful place.

Amir Jaber: These measures that you are taking we hope will return matters to normal.

The President: | (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1) We will push Chapter 7 at the UN. I want to say how sorry we are that we had no forces in place when we got your appeal for support. We are talking with Saudi Arabia about what we might do with them to get more forces in the area.

Amir Jaber: | (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: | (b) (1)

(b) (1)

Amir Jaber: I will call (b) (1) as soon as possible.

The President: Very good. He told me he had a good talk with (b) (1) and I know he is working very hard. (b) (1)
(b) (1)

Amir Jaber: | (b) (1)
(b) (1)

(u) (1)

The President: I agree. You can't do it. I know he strongly favors your return. He is a good man in this regard. And he doesn't want anything to do with (b) (1)

Amir Jaber: | (b) (1)
(b) (1)

The President: I feel that (b) (1) will tell the Emissary just that.

Amir Jaber: That would be the most effective measure.

The President: I reminded him this guy told you and King Fahd that there would be no invasion. The next thing at 2 in the morning it was another Pearl Harbor and he had stuck you in the back. His word is not very good.

Amir Jaber: His promises and commitments have no value.

The President: The Prime Minister of Japan is willing to support sanctions to bring about your return and a troop withdrawal.

Amir Jaber: Thank you for the serious and tremendous work you have done for us. We are confident our ally will continue your efforts to resolve this.

The President: Thank you for your call. My respects to your family. I won't give up on an Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of you and your family to their rightful place no matter how long it takes. Because we can't accommodate this new 1990 fuhrer, Saddam Hussein.

Amir Jaber: My sincere thanks again. I wish you success.

The President: Good-bye and God bless you.